Łupkowski Paweł, Dlaczego funkcjonalizm H. Putnama nie musi pytać o ontologiczny status stanó1) mentalnych (Why H. Putnam functionalism does not have to ask for ontological status of mental states?)
The article is a very short presentation of Putnam’s functionalism and its role for strong AI supporters.
At the beginning the authors presents shortly main assumptions of the Putnam’s functionalism which has been presented in a book “Mind and Machines”. The main Putnam’s theory assumption is identification of mental states with functional states, which can not be reduced to physical states of an organism.
Functionalism is a very attractive support for a strong version of Artificial Intelligence, which can be characterized as belief that thinking consists on computations, in particular consciousness results by appropriate computational process.
In the end the authors rises also some well known two counterarguments against the Putnam’s functionalism and strong AI position: reversed spectrum argument and Searle’s Chineese room argument.
The author indicates one of the most influential scientific approach to the nature of the human being. He indicates the philosophical background as well as strong AI position itself. The article is short and superficial, however it’s journalist character might be an advantage too.